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Extensive regulations govern campaign
finance at the state and national levels. Congress
has recently passed the McCain-Feingold law
that restricts contributions and electoral adver-
tising. Many states, including Washington, have
similar regulations. Washington’s regulations
limit contributions from individuals, political
action committees, and political parties.
Overall, campaign finance regulation in
Washington State has been able to reduce the
sums spent on campaigns for the state legislature.
Contrary to the claims of proponents, campaign
finance regulation has hindered electoral competi-
tion in the state. Incumbents were less likely to face
either primary or general election challengers after
the regulations went into effect. In addition, candi-
dates who challenged incumbents during the gen-
eral election were less likely to win. 
Proponents of contribution limits hope to
pass new regulations in additional states and
expect McCain-Feingold to enhance electoral
competition. The experience of Washington State
suggests that both aspirations are unlikely to
become reality.
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In recent years campaign finance regula-
tion has been one of the most hotly debated
issues in Congress. Congress recently passed
and President Bush signed the most exten-
sive new regulations on campaign finance in
a generation. The new law bans contribu-
tions to political parties (so-called soft
money) and heavily regulates broadcast ads
close to an election.1 Many supporters believe
this legislation will both reduce corruption
and promote electoral competition. They
also aim to expand their drive for new regu-
lations to the states, building on the govern-
ment-financing legislation recently enacted
in Arizona and Maine. 
The experiences of the states provide data
to use in assessing the likely consequences of
new federal and state regulations. There is a
great deal of variation in the state campaign
finance laws that govern fundraising for
seats in the state legislatures. In addition, in
recent years many states have enacted com-
prehensive reforms of their laws governing
campaign finance. This evidence can give us a
clue about the likely effects of both McCain-
Feingold and various campaign finance regu-
lations proposed for the states. 
The Washington Regulations
During the past 20 years, most states have
strengthened their restrictions on the
amount of money that individuals and par-
ties can donate to candidates running for the
state legislature.2 Among the most dramatic
restrictions were those found in Proposition
134 passed by Washington voters in 1992.
Before the adoption of Proposition 134, indi-
viduals, parties, and political action commit-
tees were all free to donate as much as they
wanted to candidates running for the state
legislature. The new regulations limited
donations from individuals and PACs to
$500 per candidate per election. Party dona-
tions were limited by a formula that had as
one of its terms the number of registered vot-
ers in a district. In practice, the sum worked
out to $22,500 from a party for a candidate
for the state legislature and $45,000 for a
candidate for the state senate.3 Those new
limits suddenly made it impossible for a
party to bankroll an entire campaign for the
state legislature. Individuals running for a
seat in the Washington legislature had to
obtain additional support from either PACs
or individuals, both of which faced strict lim-
its on how much they could donate.
Washington’s experience with campaign
finance regulation over the last four election
cycles thus provides evidence about how lim-
its on donations affect both candidate
fundraising and electoral competitiveness.  
Candidate Fundraising
Washington’s campaign finance regula-
tions reduced the sums spent on campaigns
for the state legislature. Spending on state
legislative races in Washington State
increased in every election year from 1978 to
1992. However, after the new regulations
took effect, the situation changed. In real
terms, the sum spent on state legislative races
dropped by more than 26 percent between
1992 and 1994. As Figure 1 indicates, spend-
ing did rebound somewhat in 1996, 1998,
and 2000; however, the total spent in each of
those years was less than the total sum spent
in 1992 in the last election before the regula-
tions took effect. The average sum spent
before regulation was $15.02 million; the
average after was $13.38. Washingtonians
thus spent, on average, $1.64 million less
during each of the last four election cycles.
Figure 1 indicates that overall spending
declined after regulation, but overall totals
might not be the best way to gauge the effects
of campaign finance regulation on fundrais-
ing. A series of candidates lacking fundrais-
ing skills might have biased the results
downward. To deal with that, the most
expensive campaigns both before and after
regulation were analyzed. That should prove
instructive because in the most expensive
campaigns both candidates are actively seek-
ing to gain a fundraising edge over their
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opponent. If spending in the most expensive
races has declined since regulation, that
would provide even better evidence that cam-
paign finance regulation hampers candi-
dates’ fundraising.
As Figure 2 indicates, that appears to be the
case and is especially evident in races for the
state senate. Spending in the four most expen-
sive races peaked in 1990 and never again
exceeded that level after the regulations were
enacted. Overall, the average for the four most
expensive races in the years prior to regulation
greatly exceeds the average cost of the four
most expensive races in the years since regula-
tion. In fact, we see a decline of almost half a
million dollars in those races, on average.
For the Washington state house the evi-
dence is more mixed. The total spent in the
four most expensive races did decline in the
two elections after Proposition 134 passed.
However, the amount spent in the four most
expensive house races increased in 1998 and
sharply increased in 2000. However, it should
be noted that races for the Washington house
are less expensive than races for the
Washington senate. As a result, the limits on
donations were bound to have less of an
impact on fundraising for house elections.
Electoral Competition
Proposition 134 clearly succeeded in reduc-
ing the total amount of money spent on races
for the two Washington legislative houses.
What have been its effects on political compe-
tition in Washington State? Many supporters
of campaign finance regulation argue that
restrictions on fundraising will increase com-
petition. They maintain that most elections
are uncompetitive because incumbents are
able to raise more money than challengers. As
a result, limits on fundraising are necessary to
reduce that fundraising advantage. However,
opponents of fundraising restrictions contend
that limits will restrict competition. They
argue that incumbents possess a number of
inherent, nonmonetary advantages including
high name recognition, franking privileges,
and the ability to assist constituents. Given all
that, challengers need to raise a lot of money
to make up for the inherent advantages of
incumbents. Fundraising restrictions make
that uphill climb even steeper.4
Overall, the evidence from Washington
State strongly indicates that campaign finance
regulation has reduced political competition.
That can be demonstrated in a variety of ways.
3
The evidence
from Washington
State strongly
indicates that
campaign finance
regulation has
reduced political
competition.
Figure 1
Total Campaign Spending on State Legislative Races in Washington, 1990–2000 
Sources: Election Financing Fact Book (Olympia: Washington State Public Disclosure Commission,
1990–2000).
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First, the number of uncontested elections for
the Washington legislature has sharply
increased since the passage of Proposition
134. Table 15 shows that in 1990 and 1992, the
two election years that immediately preceded
regulation, 12 percent of the seats in the
Washington house were uncontested.
However, in the four elections that immedi-
ately followed regulation, 17 percent of seats
in the state house were uncontested. In the
state senate, where elections are more expen-
sive and money plays an even larger role, the
results are even more dramatic. The percent-
age of seats that were uncontested went from
6 percent to 21 percent over the same time
span. This difference is statistically significant.  
Campaign finance regulation likely
played a large role in that reduction in com-
petition. After regulation, fundraising for a
race in the state legislature became signifi-
cantly more time-consuming since individu-
als could no longer obtain most of their
funds from a single source. It seems likely
that the regulations discouraged many
potential candidates from entering the fray.
In addition to being less likely to face a
major party challenger after regulation,
incumbent state legislators also became less
                                                                                                                                          
Before Regulation After Regulation
(90–92) (94–00) Difference
                                                                                                                                          
State senate 6% 19% 13%
a
State house 12% 17% 5%
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Figure 2 
Total Spending for the Four Most Expensive Races for the Washington State
Legislature, 1990–2000
Sources: Election Financing Fact Book (Olympia: Washington State Public Disclosure Commission, 1990–2000).
Table 1
Percentage of Races for the Washington State Legislature That Were Uncontested,
1990–2000
Sources: Election Financing Fact Book (Olympia: Washington State Public Disclosure Commission, 1990–2000).
a A statistically significant difference.
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Campaign finance
regulation likely
played a large role
in the reduction
in competition.
likely to face a primary challenger from their
own party. Table 26 indicates that, during the
two elections that preceded the passage of
Proposition 134, 18 percent of all incumbent
state senators faced a primary challenger.
However, in the four elections that followed
regulation, only 11 percent of those running
for reelection to the state senate were chal-
lenged in their party’s primary. The percent-
age of incumbents facing a primary chal-
lenger dropped in the state house as well.
Overall, the evidence indicates that restric-
tions placed on fundraising seem to have dis-
couraged prospective candidates from
mounting both primary and general election
challenges to incumbent state legislators.
Campaign finance regulation has benefit-
ed incumbent state legislators in other ways as
well. State senators who did face a challenger
were even more likely to emerge victorious.
Table 37 indicates that, in state senate races,
the percentage of major party challengers who
defeated incumbents decreased from 18 per-
cent in the two elections preceding regulation
to 11 percent in the four elections immediate-
ly following regulation. We know from other
states that, in order to be competitive, chal-
lengers need to be able to raise a substantial
amount of money. Since Proposition 134
made fundraising more difficult, it is not sur-
prising that fewer challengers in the state sen-
ate races were successful.
The results from the state house tell a
slightly different story. After the passage of
Proposition 134, the percentage of major
party challengers who defeated incumbents
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Table 2
Percentage of Races for the Washington State Legislature in Which an Incumbent
Faced an Active Challenger in a Party Primary, 1990–2000
                                                                                                                                               
Average
                                                                                 
Before Regulation (90–92) After Regulation (94–00) Difference
                                                                                                                                               
State senate 18% 11% 7%
State house 11% 9% 2%
                                                                                                                                               
Sources: Election Financing Fact Book (Olympia: Washington State Public Disclosure Commission,
1990–2000).
Note: An active challenger is one who raised money for the campaign.
Sources: Election Financing Fact Book (Olympia: Washington State Public Disclosure Commission,
1990–2000).
                                                                                                                                               
Before Regulation (90–92) After Regulation (94–00) Difference
                                                                                                                                               
State senate 18% 11% 7%
State house 9% 11% 2%
                                                                                                                                               
Table 3
Victories by Challengers over Incumbents in General Election Races for the
Washington State Legislature, 1990–2000
actually increased by two percentage points.
However, that is largely because 21 chal-
lengers for the house, all Republicans, won in
1994, an excellent year for Republicans
nationally. Those victories by Republican
challengers in an unusual year are outliers
that might distort our conclusions. If the
1994 election is excluded from the dataset,
challengers were less likely to defeat incum-
bents after the regulations were passed.
Conclusion
Overall, campaign finance regulation in
Washington State has been able to reduce the
sums spent on campaigns for the state legisla-
ture. That is evident in terms of both the overall
totals spent and the totals spent in the most
expensive races. However, contrary to the claims
of proponents, campaign finance regulation
has hindered electoral competition in
Washington State. The decline in competition
can be seen in a variety of ways. Incumbents
were less likely to face either primary or general
election challengers after the regulations took
effect. In addition, candidates who challenged
incumbents during the general election were
less likely to win. Overall, campaign regulation
had a greater overall effect on races for the state
senate than on elections for the state house.
That is unsurprising as races for the state senate
are more costly than races for the state house.
This analysis holds implications for both
McCain-Feingold and proposals to extend
more campaign finance regulations to the
states. Much of the emphasis in the new federal
regulations is on placing limits on contribu-
tions to political parties. However, political par-
ties are the only entities that consistently
donate more money to challengers than to
incumbents.8 Given McCain-Feingold’s limits
on party donations to campaigns for national
office, a similar decline in competition may very
well occur in elections for the U.S. House and
Senate. 
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